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Abstract: Following the process of globalization, national law has lost its normative 
force as a symbol of positive legal order. The legislators’ intentions have been substituted 
by those of the judges, allowing human rights, fundamental individual rights – in the most 
modern sense of the term – to produce institutional and judicial artifices to effectively 
safeguard “individualism”, in and of globalisation against the abuse of the majority. In 
this sense, a denationalisation of the States has followed the creation of the global 
juridical dimension. The creation of new alternative spaces to national space, determined 
both by processes that respond to transnational power and processes that operate outside 
institutionalised political power, can appear physiological in global logic, but it shows 
the absence (or non-activation) of a set of tools with which to generate “antibodies” 
against external attacks brought about by new situations and the subsequent artificiality 
of the relationship between the two dimensions (national and supranational). 
 
Keywords: Nomos of the Earth; Globalization; Transconstitutionalism; 
Policontexturality.  
 
1. Introduction 
The problem of “where” has taken on a great deal of importance 
following the global phenomena which have forced legal scholars to 
reconsider the question of space. In Europe and the United States, 
constitutionalism is established according to two different cultures of 
constitutional changes. On one hand, the European context is marked 
by the tension between Constitution/State and politics (the best example 
of which  being the German Weimar Republic); on the other hand, with 
the new Nomos of the Earth (20
th
 century), dominated by American 
international doctrines of interference on a global level, politics takes 
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hold of the economy to identify itself with it and give life to the 
principle of cujus oeconomia, ejus regio. European States stop being 
exclusively guided by political interest of intrastate power (the Nomos 
of the Earth) to take an interest in governing the change of social 
structures. Mirkine-Guetzevitch spoke about a European «general 
constitutional law» founded on the rationalisation of power to respond 
to society’s needs and the transformational requirements of rights (in a 
social dimension and no longer in an economic-individual dimension), 
in accord with an international public law of reciprocal respect between 
the States.
1
  
     In actual fact, the logic of cujus oeconomia, ejus regio follows the 
expansion of the American Nomos of the Earth in its different 
directions compared to the jus publicum europeaeum. The global 
context is characterised by moments of transformation, for example the 
process of European integration and the “constitutional” role of 
European judicial decisions and international cases of the ECHR. 
European culture entrenches itself behind the law against “informal” 
changes, negating validity to phenomena which are placed extra 
constitutionem. In this picture we include both attempts at constitutional 
reform which are constitutionally unfaithful and political tendencies in 
fraud of the Constitution; so that, if the legal and political systems 
begin to use the same language, decisions are made within the bounds 
of political correctness but outside the correct constitutional structure.  
                                                 
1
 See B. MIRKINE-GUETZEVITCH, Le costituzioni europee, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 
1954. 
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     The article develops the following questions in three sections. In the 
first part, I underline how national law has lost its normative force as a 
symbol of positive legal order:  with the process of globalisation, it has 
been overtaken by a law whose origin is in the public opinion of 
members of society, in judges’ decisions and in judicial science. In the 
second paragraph, I will focus on the role of the new techno-
economical space which has eradicated the original Nomos which 
marked the link between a social community and its territory to indicate 
the beginning of a new configuration of the relationship between 
economy and politics. Finally, I support the thesis in which the State 
must intervene in regulating and constitutionalising the global market, 
otherwise, along with the social counter-power of other spheres (NGO, 
media, trade unions etc.) it can have an effect on the economy, 
generating rules of self-limitation in order to preserve itself. 
 
2. From a denationalisation of the States to the global judicial 
dimension 
 
From the Single European Act to the Maastricht Treaty and the Charter 
of Rights, the phases of evolution of European constitutionalism have 
generated among member States an awareness that the “Constitution” 
of the European Union would never be a “document” created by one 
single constituent power but something different to the classical 
Constitution in the Kelsenian sense; something that was being 
structured as a “process” through which to acknowledge the empirical 
legitimacy of the “Constitution” even after the consolidation of its 
formal authority. Confirmation of this is given in the constitutional 
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architecture which, currently, does not appear to have been validated by 
any formal procedure of adoption by a constitutional demos.
2
 
     The absence of a Grundnorm (Fundamental Law), as an incomplete 
moment of European integrity-integration, has caused multiple 
consequences both internally and externally, both on a European level 
and a global level. On one hand, this has led to national demands for 
definition of collective identity: the lack of a common code (in which 
every individual can identify himself, as this code has been created by 
everyone) and the consolidation of a supranational public power has 
caused reactions of delimitation of power among the member States, 
opposing the protection of fundamental rights and national identity to it 
in order to preserve the constitutional specificity. On the other hand, the 
individual, through European legislation, has been emancipated from 
national restrictions to the point of becoming one of the main pivotal of 
the European legal system, bringing about a multilevel judicial 
constitutional law, a multilevel protection which has broadened the 
space of intervention of judges in giving greater clarity to the 
indeterminate nature of precepts. With the process of globalisation, 
national law has lost its normative force as a symbol of positive legal 
order. It has been overtaken by a law whose origin is in the public 
opinion of members of society, in judges’ decisions and in legal 
science.
3
 
                                                 
2
 See J.H.H. WEILER, Federalismo e costituzionalismo: il «Sonderweg» europeo, in G. 
ZAGREBELSKY, ed., Diritti e Costituzione nell’Unione Europea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 
2003, p. 22. 
3
 See G. FASSÒ, Storia della filosofia del diritto, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001, p. 197. 
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     The legislators’ intentions have been substituted by those of the 
judges, allowing human rights, fundamental individual rights – in the 
most modern sense of the term – to produce institutional and judicial 
artifices to effectively safeguard “individualism”, in and of 
globalisation against the abuse of the majority. In this sense, a 
denationalisation of the States has followed the creation of the global 
juridical dimension. The States, with the choice of giving way to 
judges, have legitimised a dialogue which, in recent years, has involved 
national courts, the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights. This has in part led to the communitarisation of domestic law 
through shared values and spaces,
4
 and subsequently, to the increased 
flexibility of State powers; in part it has also led to the creation of a soft 
law,
5
 a law which is not binding in its legal strength but sufficiently 
strong in its programmatic structure to represent a break from 
traditional laws which have become too rigid for the logic behind 
European Union governments, and instrumental in steering capitalism 
and “technique”. 
     The processes of internationalisation have put national legal systems 
up against the same structural problems, producing forms of 
convergence in the search for solutions that, while different, can be 
considered “equivalent” in the functional sense. If we consider the 
European Treaties, it is clear that after the creation of a space without 
frontiers, a process of “delocalisation” and “dehistoricization” 
                                                 
4
 See V. PICCONE, L’«internazionalizzazione» dei diritti umani, in G. BRONZINI – F. 
GUARRIELLO – V. PICCONE, eds., Le scommesse dell’Europa, Roma, Ediesse, 2009, p. 22. 
5
 See G. AZZARITI, Brevi notazioni sulle trasformazioni del diritto costituzionale e sulle 
sorti del diritto del lavoro in Europa, ibid., p. 139. 
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followed, after which individuals experienced the gap between being an 
“individual-member” of a political and legal institution and an 
“individual-member” of the economic space, that is, an active and 
passive part of the new economic assets. The effect on global society 
was also the division into sectors according to functions, a mass of 
global cultures, a vast amount of social systems which allow only single 
fragmented ties. 
     Each of us feels as if we belong to two spatial orders: the concrete 
places of our origin, our homeland, small or large, mutual exchanges 
influenced by State borders; on the other hand, the “system of universal 
dependence”, the global extents of constitutional “technique” and 
economy, telematic communication, silent and objective markets. We 
come and go between places and non-places, between terrestrial 
positions and pure spaces. Our identity is split between civis and homo 
oeconomicus, between obedience to the laws of the city and the laws of 
global space.
6
 Throughout time the relationship between the individual 
and society has never been static because it is built around and through 
two protagonists which are neither isolated nor immobile. In order to 
interact with society an individual has to look out on the world and 
open himself to it. The world welcomes him and shows itself to have a 
wealth of definitions, a whole system of attitudes, an ever active 
patrimony of ways of operating.
7
 Consequently, the individual is 
conditioned by his being in the world, in his being a product of his own 
particular time which becomes entwined with the time of the society in 
                                                 
6
 See N. IRTI, Norma e luoghi. Problemi di geo-diritto, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001, p. 80. 
7
 See G. CAPOGRASSI, Analisi dell’esperienza comune, Milano, Giuffrè, 1975. 
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which he is operating. The aims which a society intends to pursue 
become an integral part of a “continuous flow of events” of which that 
continuum of deeds done by the individual becomes a part. This is the 
origin of social and juridical pluralism, by which, ever new instances 
and events refer back to constitutionally safeguarded values which are 
waiting to be realized, while the certainty of the law is continually 
undermined, never completely made concrete. Although the law is 
expected to guarantee juridical safety it cannot in the long run avoid, as 
it evolves, creating something “new” bringing a social harmony 
founded on a balance between stability and change. A continual 
evolution and controlled transformation can be envisaged where the 
function of the law is not decided exclusively by an analysis of the 
equilibrium of the system but instead, takes into account upheavals, 
irregularities and states of transition. It could be said that it is a time of 
“metamorphosis”,8 founded on the gradual change of a system whose 
identity has to remain unaltered. 
     The Constitution needs to be aware of social change, new conflicts, 
the continuing need for new solutions and interpretations, and 
institutional requirements for abstract and general rules in order to 
achieve certainty in the law and for the law. On the other hand, the 
Constitution needs to evaluate the real possibilities for resolving 
controversy and preserving its fundamental values.  
     The fundamental principles are the tool which the Constitution uses 
to resolve controversy, considering that these to be such, and therefore, 
effective (as the base of social and legal order which remains faithful to 
                                                 
8
 See F. OST, Le temps du droit, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1999. 
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its original matrix, while constantly renewing itself), must be witness to 
a present which does not repudiate its history, or rather, a history which 
extends seamlessly into the present: being and becoming a time. For 
this reason, these principles carry out a function that is both 
conservative and promotional, maintaining the original values, (of 
which they are an imperfect translation) and at the same time opening 
up to new developments.
9
 
     It is well known that Europe has always sought in the law the tool of 
unification so as not to yield to the individualist temptation of overseas 
case law and to maintain the culture of common law and civil law 
separate in respect for their different historical origins;
10
 but the passage 
of one “rule” from one legal order (supranational) to another (national) 
has put an end to the original significance of the rule and the necessary 
re-elaboration of the same in consideration of the new socio-legal 
context.  
     This artificial relationship that has arisen between the two systems 
has given way to something that could be assimilated in a new legal 
formant, a «legal irritant», to quote Gunther Teubner, allowing the 
inclusion of a “rule” from one context to another by using techniques of 
adaptation (e.g. constitutionally conforming interpretation or 
Drittwirkung) or inexorably evolving dynamics that expose the internal 
context to changes (e.g. community or international judicial living 
                                                 
9
 See A. RUGGERI, L’identità costituzionale alla prova: i principi fondamentali fra 
revisioni costituzionali polisemiche e interpretazioni-applicazioni «ragionevoli», in «Ars 
Interpretandi. Rivista di ermeneutica giuridica», 1996, pp. 113-129. 
10
 G. TEUBNER, “Legal Irritants”: come l’unificazione del diritto dà luogo a nuove 
divergenze, in «Ars Interpretandi. Rivista di ermeneutica giuridica», 2006, p. 156. 
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law).
11
 Consequently, the main dilemma seems not only to be the 
inadequacy of the law in incorporating the external rule in the national 
territory: after all, in the past, positivism bent to procedural rules and 
the Kelsenian Grundnorm, which claimed to explain the validity of any 
system, in fact, based all the States on the “rule of law”, to then reveal 
itself as an empty container, suitable for the inclusion of any content 
but determining several problems of transformation of meaning and 
role of the accepted term. 
     Artificiality, absolute unnaturality, is the foremost trait of modern 
law, or rather, of legal modernity. After breaking with natural law and 
every binding foundation, political and legal will can receive any 
content, adopt any rule. Laws are artificial, indifferent to their content, 
able to determine their own time and space. Enactment of these laws is 
mere formality: it is just procedure, and procedure becomes the basis of 
the law. Such artificiality  allows the law to detach itself from its place 
of origin and to be extended as an agreement between States, to any 
number of territories.
12
 
     The current dilemma concerns the division between cultural 
polycentrism and functional differentiation which has led the national 
territory to be part of the worldwide framework and thus the national 
law detached from its culture of origin.
13
 For this reason, Teubner’s 
«legal irritants» irritate the links of law to society. Foreign laws are 
                                                 
11
 In Italy, uniformity of the court decisions comes by means of living law, meaning the 
settled interpretation of the higher courts and successive adaptation by the lower courts. 
12
See N. IRTI, Il carattere politico-giuridico del mercato, in «Rassegna economica», 
LXVIII, 2, 2004, p. 1. 
13
 See N. LUHMANN, The Paradoxy of Observing Systems, in «Cultural Critique», 31, The 
Politics of Systems and Environments, Part II, Autumn 1995, p. 37. 
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irritating not only in relation to the national legal situation itself but also 
in relation to the social situation to which the law is closely linked in 
certain circumstances. As legal irritants, they force the specific 
episteme of national law to a reconstruction in the network of its 
distinctions. As social irritants, they lead the social discourse to which 
the law is closely bound to a reconstruction of itself. In this way, they 
give way to two different series of events whose interaction leads to an 
evolving dynamic that could find a new balance in the self-value of the 
situation involved. Such a complex and unstable process rarely leads to 
the convergence of the legal systems in question, but rather to the 
creation of new gaps in the relationship between operationally close 
social systems.
14
 
     This founding relationship of recontextualisations both in a legal and 
social sense, as Teubner writes, cannot be considered the creator of a 
new institutional identity for unilateral determination (or rather, for 
legal transfer), nor can it reduce itself to the causal dependence between 
independent and dependent variables, or a relationship between an 
economic base and a legal supra-structure. Rather, it is a symbolic 
space of compatibility of different meanings that allows different 
possible results. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
  See TEUBNER, Legal Irritants, cit., p. 169. 
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2. Artificiality of Law and global techno-economy. The fall of the 
ancient Nomos of the Earth 
 
The importance to replace the Constitution in a spatial dimension which 
takes into account the abolition of frontiers will allow the final board of 
coordinates so that constitutional laws do not become lost in existential 
ontologism, whose futile result is the same as all the ahistorical 
conceptions of subjectivity, well expressed in Heidegger’s human 
Dasein, in Jaspers’ confused historic conscience or in Gadamer’s 
labyrinthine hermeneutic historicity.
15
 To depend solely on temporality 
to give continuity to the Constitution and identify its application with 
an act of faith in an “open” Constitution that reveals a mythical nature 
means to expose the Constitution to attacks and manipulations, because 
no barriers have been created which can define and realise the spatial 
dimensions of the Constitution (and the State). The eradication of 
constituent power signifies the lack of a precise moment in time in 
which a pluralist society chooses to organise itself according to a set of 
rules and principles to “rely on” and recognise a “writing degree zero” 
from which to derive the history of the new Nomos of the Earth. The 
opening of “economic globalisation”, in the era of cosmopolitanism and 
internationalisation, has brought about a defenceless, neutral State, not 
only as a welfare state, but also as a political entity and binding form of 
organised cohabitation.
16
 
                                                 
15
 See P. DE VEGA GARCIA, Mondializzazione e diritto costituzionale: la crisi del 
principio democratico nel costituzionalismo attuale, in «Diritto pubblico», VII, 3, 2001, 
p. 1087. 
16
 See ibid., p. 1091. 
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     The intermediate function carried out by the same State at a 
supranational level between the European Union and the national 
system, in order to guarantee stability and legitimacy of the process of 
social integration is, however, decisive in the safeguarding of 
constitutional guarantees that risk being evaded by European economic 
policies. The strength of Europe lies in the institutions which represent 
it and in the political processes determined by “regularity” of 
integration. What emerges from the phase of transition that has 
involved all member States towards the unification of Europe is a 
process of transformation realised in its “applicational level” and not 
only in the phase of «enactment of formal legislation».
17
 The logic of 
the market and the representative State support the unstoppable and 
detailed enactment of European legislation in which the determination 
of the aim is essentially the «fundamental political decision», 
normatively consolidated, therefore all political acts are instrumental in 
the phase of implementation of the Union’s goals. These acts, 
differentiated by name, type, value and legal force do not take into 
account any form of responsibility and control of political trends – due 
to a lack of suitable methods of implementing liability and the lack of a 
liable body which can regulate political power.
18
 These acts do not 
express any determining authority of the aims of the Union: the opening 
towards “impersonal” logic (the universality of human rights is the 
                                                 
17
 M. CARDUCCI, Il problema esplicativo delle trasformazioni costituzionali. Appunti per 
una comparazione di teorie e prassi, in A. SPADARO, ed., Le «trasformazioni» 
costituzionali nell’età della transizione, Torino, Giappichelli, 2000, p. 162. 
18
 See G. FERRARA, L’indirizzo politico dalla nazionalità all’apolidia, available at 
http://www.astrid-online.it. 
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clearest example of this, both for the unconditional nature of the theme, 
and for the risk of it becoming merely a constitutional “symbol”) has 
started a process of universalisation of the content of western 
constitutionalism (democracy, delegation, values, equality) which in 
reality clashes with the primary social levels (race, religion, language) 
that seem to prevail over functional roles imposed by law.
19
 The 
political trend which on a global scale have been consolidated in 
institutions, in the long term risks being exhausted by the regularity of 
politics functioning without law; it continues to be denationalised to the 
point of becoming stateless due to something that has always been able 
to cross borders, more or less legally, but surely efficiently: money, 
which in turn has always had much to do with State sovereignty but 
never with popular sovereignty.  
     The creation of new alternative spaces to national space, determined 
both by processes that respond to transnational power and processes 
that operate outside institutionalised political power, can appear 
physiological in global logic, but it shows the absence (or non-
activation) of a set of tools with which to generate “antibodies” against 
external attacks brought about by new situations and the subsequent 
artificiality of the relationship between the two dimensions (national 
and supranational). 
     Artificiality of law goes hand in hand with global techno-economy 
and therefore in identifying its essence, it can be placed either opposite 
it as an enemy or beside it as an ally. The eradication of law, the fall of 
the ancient Nomos, the ability to determine times and spaces of 
                                                 
19
 See  CARDUCCI, Il problema esplicativo delle trasformazioni costituzionali, cit., p. 166. 
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application: only these factors permit it to be on the same level of the 
techno-economy. Through agreements between States and therefore 
with artificial tools, the law is able to embrace, either entirely or 
partially, the planetary economy.  
     The new techno-economical space has eradicated the original Nomos 
which marked the link between a social community and its territory to 
indicate the beginning of a new configuration of the relationship 
between economy and politics. This process of reconfiguration, having 
in legal “technique” the most suitable tool and the natural environment 
with and in which to develop, must overcome the constitutional 
problems of transnational regimes in which the structural aspect, 
determined by constitutional rules, which give rationality to the system, 
has already been created. It is raising consciousness that the process of 
European integration, European judicial acts and International decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights are not a product of the 
historical conflict between law and politics but the results of new 
mechanisms: or technical structuring (like European Governance, 
which seems to be a “tacit revision” of national Constitutions or 
“anaesthesia” of their normative power) or jurisprudential structuring 
(with the decisions of the Court of Justice or the European Court of 
Human Rights in Europe, and especially the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in Latin America, where the interpretation of the Inter-
American Convention are imposed on or condition the national 
interpretations of judges, becoming a heteronomous factor of informal 
modification compared to the contradictory national constitutional 
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results).
20
 The global picture determined by economic power, which 
crosses territorial confines according to market logic and world trade, 
shows how State law struggles to provide the suitable conceptual tools 
for forming institutions capable of distinguish, if not managing, State 
sovereignty and free supranational economy.
21
 
 
3. Relying on the State sovereignty against the great virtue of 
artificiality 
 
But the process of European integration is involved in more widespread 
phenomena of constitutional inter-connection which does not always 
respond to the logic of cujus oeconomia, ejus regio. Alongside the well 
known phenomenon of the relationship between international public 
law and State law, is the new dynamic recently named 
“transconstitutionalism”. In particular between international law for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental constitutional laws (e.g. 
ECHR and Const. States); supranational law and State laws (e.g. EU); 
State law and transnational organisations (e.g. WTO); national systems 
and local extra-State systems (e.g. indigenous law); supranational law 
and international law (e.g. ECHR and EU). Therefore, the connection, 
being no longer intrastate, becomes characterised by contexts of 
different places and subjects – public or private – leading to the 
assertion of what has been defined «polycontextural law». Can 
«polycontextural law» destructure the unilateralism of the American 
                                                 
20
 See M. CARDUCCI, Dal Nomos della terra del diritto costituzionale occidentale al 
trans costituzionalismo policontesturale, lecture in Comparative Public Law at the 
University of Bari (Italy), May 7, 2010. 
21
 See C. SCHMITT, Il Nomos della terra, Milano, Adelphi, 1991, p. 301. 
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Nomos? Can polycont2extural law favour the reciprocity of intrastate 
standards?
22
 
     Furthermore, the management of the global dimension itself – 
whether it is considered trans-constitutional  or polycontextural – is not 
necessarily subjected to the logic of cujus oeconomia, ejus regio, but it 
is entrusted to the States, to interstate agreements (according to the 
original project through which the European Union was decided by the 
same States in full implementation of their sovereignty). It is evident 
that the current scenario presents a severance between territory and 
space, that is, between State sovereignty and the (supranational) 
dimension of the economy, between “where” and “everywhere”. The 
“where” of law could be “everywhere”: anywhere that has been agreed 
upon by interstate pacts. We discover in this way the great virtue of 
artificiality, which may not be of any place but can be in any place, and 
can therefore give a terrestrial base to global phenomena. It does not 
obey any Nomos, which would joined it to the individuality of a place, 
but merely answers the need for more precise and effective 
functionality.
23
 If the response to a «catastrophe contingency», ever 
more acute in the current financial crisis, can only come from within 
the State, then the State must intervene in regulating and 
constitutionalising the global market, otherwise, along with the social 
counter-power of other spheres (NGO, media, trade unions etc.) it can 
                                                 
22
 See CARDUCCI, Dal Nomos della terra del diritto costituzionale occidentale al trans 
costituzionalismo policontesturale, cit. 
23
 See IRTI, Norma e luoghi, cit., pp. 76-77. 
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have an effect on the economy, generating «self-controlling impulses» 
through rules of self-limitation.
24
  
     These rules of self-discipline are not inherent to every system but 
represent that «clamping lever» of the system against internal risks and 
external attacks: this is the distinction between structural and functional 
Constitution, both relating to the necessary content of a “Fundamental 
Law”. Structural/Kelsenian Constitution represents the sources of 
producing law that guarantees the rationality of the system, while 
functional Constitution differs from structural Constitution in that it 
does not belong necessary to any system, it comprises all limitative 
rules which impede self-damage of the system by driving out any such 
tendencies. The Constitution will be ultimately tested when appealing 
to those limitative rules when faced with a challenge – almost a circuit 
breaker when faced with a blackout. These rules will protect the 
Constitution from destructive and self-destructive attacks only if 
political forces can guarantee the effectiveness of these rules.  
     Mediation of political will permit the States to construct their own 
sovereignty by translating the responsibility of decisions into laws. At 
the same time, political choices are as ever the real creators of 
economic spaces and the economy is formed around State rules and 
laws. Therefore, on one hand, the crisis of normativity is cause and 
effect of the creation of contra or extra constitutionem rules which are 
legitimate because they conform to an evolutional process which 
recognises the EU as the ideal space in which to embrace the challenges 
                                                 
24
 M. DOGLIANI, Costituzione in senso formale, materiale, strutturale e funzionale: a 
proposito di una riflessione di Gunther Teubner sulle tendenze autodistruttive dei sistemi 
sociali, available at http://www.costituzionalismo.it. 
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of globalisation: a «process of positivisation» that is modulated around 
a «series of operations of recognition and identification», or rather, a 
continuing and widespread hermeneutic practice of acceptance and use, 
articulated over all levels, from “technical” levels, recognised by the 
same system, to non-institutionalised levels of private citizens, who 
experience the law as valid and favour it over other possibilities. On the 
other hand, there is the affirmation of a new aequitas in the “figurative” 
path of modern subject, summoned to reclaim the past in order to 
preserve it and support it in the future.  
 
«The process of European integration presents many challenges to the 
member States. The ECHR is an international treaty with a Fundamental 
Rights Charter and the national constitutions consider it as an essential 
parameter for their jurisprudence. National constitutional jurisprudence 
is to be in conformity with Strasbourg jurisprudence: this kind of 
approach allows fundamental rights to have two sides of the same 
identity, one is handled by the national constitution, and the other one by 
the ECHR. In this context a frequent question is what the mechanism to 
link the ECHR to the national constitutional orders is: being a formal part 
of the national constitutional order as in Austria (the most far-reaching 
solution); being the essential criteria for the interpretation of internal 
fundamental rights as in Spain (Constitution Art. 10.2); being a 
normative layer between ordinary legislation and the Constitution as in 
France and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe; or, 
being equal to ordinary laws such as, for example, in Germany».
25
 
 
The global dimension of these problems brings with it a new law of 
spaces which can no longer provide answers relevant to historical 
continuity and logical unity typical of European law, but which will 
permit various, defined and efficient solutions. An interesting example 
of this is article 6 of the TEU: «Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
                                                 
25
 A. RAINER, The Emergence of European Constitutional Law, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org. 
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Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union's law».
26
 
     But the Lisbon Treaty did not only succeed in combining two 
notions, “constitutional traditions” and “general principles”, simplifying 
the long debate which had involved both notions; it also appears to have 
given the European Court of Human Rights a new legal status in the 
system of sources of law, thus benefiting from a role of primauté over 
national law. The decision of the Italian Consiglio di Stato (Council of 
State)
27
 no. 1220 of 2 March 2010 on this topic does not limit the 
sphere of Community law, object of direct application, as if it could 
ignore the controversial matter and above all, ignore the deficiency of 
national legislation in resolving the question at hand.
28
 
     Often Italian decisions has appealed to the principles of the ECHR, 
highlighting the exceptional necessity to disapply the national law in 
order to guarantee minimum rights to the individual or to apply the 
judicial decisions of the Strasbourg Court; or to produce a “community 
aimed” result; as the Court of Strasbourg encouraged to respect article 
35 of the ECHR which permits an appeal to the judge of the Convention 
only after exhausting internal legal paths, even though the national 
judge must interpret the State legal tools in a manner conforming to the 
Convention.  
                                                 
26
 See «Official Journal of the European Union», March 30, 2010, available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF 
27
 It is the Supreme Court in the hierarchy of administrative courts. 
28
 See G. COLAVITTI – C. PAGOTTO, Il Consiglio di Stato applica direttamente le norme 
CEDU grazie al Trattato di Lisbona: l'inizio di un nuovo percorso? Nota a Consiglio di 
Stato, sent. 2 marzo 2010, n. 1220, available at http://associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it. 
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     However, in this particular case, the judge opted for the principle of 
full and direct application of the ECHR, without disapplying specific 
internal laws contrasting with the Convention. Fully respecting 
constitutional guarantees of legality and motivation of judgements (art 
97 and 111 Italian Const.), the Council of State wanted to motivate the 
logical legal iter of the choice to disapply the national law, in order to 
ensure the prevalence of a fundamental human right safeguarded by the 
ECHR. For years constitutional decisions has swayed between trying to 
safeguard the national Nomos, favouring the territorial element, and 
practical remedies which, with the support of interpretational activity, 
opted for solutions which were more “effective” than respectful of the 
hierarchy of sources of law.  
     The entrance of the communitarian law on the national territory 
should take place through the application of international law in the 
light of a certain “peculiarity” or a “particular relevance” according to 
interpretation, the simplest tool with which to validate a system of 
values carried by law across socially accepted formats. Over time, the 
artificial and disconnected law of the new spaces has found in 
constitutional “technique” and economy loyal allies to set against the 
multiplicity of the States and the uniformity of legal discipline. It has to 
be highlighted that, the Italian system is a unified system of civil law 
(that is, of codified statutory law) and the sources of law are mainly 
written: there are several codes (civil, criminal, civil procedure, 
criminal procedure, etc.) and a large number of statutes. Precedent is 
used but not as a real “source” of law because its force is merely 
persuasive. Until the 1950s, Italian judges interpreted the law in 
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conformity to the Constitution as long as it was not in contrast to it, in 
defence of the unity and of the logical coherence of the entire juridical 
system. From the 1970s it was felt that there was a new need to 
overturn the principles of positivism. Judges turned their attention to 
the private individual, towards the recognition and defence of his rights, 
to compensation for injuries and damage. Judicial decisions are not 
traditionally a source of law in Italy and they are supposed to affect 
only the parties in the case at hand.  Italian democracy, heavily 
influenced by the example of France and the writings of French 
scholarship, has regarded legislative supremacy as a fundamental 
principle. Consequently, only the legislature, which speaks for the 
people, is supposed to make law. Although the role of Judicial 
precedent in the Italian system is not that of a source of law, nor is it a 
mere virtual authority. Instead, drawing strength over time through the 
interpretive activity of judges, it does not have prognostic pretensions 
and therefore it does not have a definitive character, limiting itself to 
the present. In this way, precedent constitutes an indicator to the 
predictability of the juridical consequences of an act, thus assuring the 
certainty of the law. It is realised in the certainty of the action through 
the law, in an ethical and utilitarian perspective, so as not to reduce it to 
pure appearance.  
     The value of the certainty of law and in law indicates the need for 
the individual to be in a position to know the consequences of his own 
actions so as to avoid intervention by the authorities, the arbitrary 
nature of power which identifies itself in the principle of 
constitutionality. In Italy, uniformity of the court decisions comes by 
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the means of living law, meaning the settled interpretation of the higher 
courts and successive adaptation by the lower courts. Since living law is 
the concrete symbol of the evolution of leading case shift, it constitutes 
one of the parameters to which the Court can refer in the evaluation of 
the constitutional legitimacy of a law. Therefore, living law is placed as 
a representative of a precise cultural context but is supported by the 
element of precedent and, thus, from the acts which are “crystallized” 
through it, it is made concrete. Particular difficulties arise in the search 
for suitable criteria for identifying a sufficiently homogeneous and 
constant standpoint capable of producing living law. For this purpose, 
precedent plays a fundamental role because it contributes to the 
concretization of living law itself; the nature of precedent is not binding 
but nevertheless has a fundamental role because it can constitute the 
heart of judicial dialectic. Since the decision of a judge is the result of a 
choice influenced by a surrounding socio-cultural environment, the 
existence of a consolidated standpoint constitutes a limit to the 
discretion of the Constitutional Court. It will have to evaluate the 
constitutional legitimacy of a law interpreted according to the 
standpoint of the Courts on the basis of living law. On the other hand, it 
represents a parameter, a value on which the relationship between a 
decision and the actual exercising of jurisdiction is founded. 
     The judge refers to foreign law in cases characterized by elements of 
internationalization or trans-nationalization with regard to the Italian 
system. A cross-reference to foreign law can be demanded as a result of 
adherence to an agreement governing uniform law; is a cultural choice 
made by the judge, a voluntary remittal and it is often determined by 
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the need to increase the level of persuasion of the decision made. 
Furthermore, the subject of comparative law is often used as a tool to 
reinforce a final decision. The diffusion of a mixed law, both public and 
private, emerges, arising from the dismissal of public functions, the 
penetration of private law within public law in civil law systems, and 
the split between public and private law in the common law system. 
Particularly with regard to Community law, it is possible to see a 
process of “hybridization”, which is a direct and indirect influence (of 
the Community law) of the reception of foreign experiences. In this 
sense, the judicial decisions of the Court of Justice and of the European 
Court of Human Rights can be seen as “legal formants” which produce 
“law”, allowing foreign experience to enter the national system and, 
through the support of national living law, to be part of “consolidated 
law”.  
     Different agencies, such as the standardisation commissions, 
technical regulating agencies and central banks have direct transactions 
which cut through State confines, meaning that the previous division 
between internal and external affairs is less clear in many areas; 
international treaties have been used to synchronise political-legal 
decisions, a way of increasing global, international, regional and socio-
legal dynamics; but the most radical change concerns national 
hierarchies replaced by a combination of institutions and treaties in 
which case, inter-dependence is the most appropriate way to describe 
the relationship between States. The practical result of this attempt of 
coexistence of the two spheres (national and supranational) has not led 
to the disappearance of States, nor to the loss of their powers, but to the 
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conviction that they will have to operate in a new way and that 
international cooperation plays an ever greater role in government 
institutions, characterised by new international orders, negotiations, 
competencies, conflict-resolving mechanisms, decentralisation policies 
of international cooperation and growing flexibility. This process of 
denationalisation has placed law and authority at a spread level among 
organisations operating at a supranational, transnational and 
international level, while nation-States are part of an interaction and a 
framework of “superior” dynamics.  
     The recognition of the autonomy and authority of Community law, 
immediately applicable and obligatory in domestic legislation, shows 
the existence of a legal space, or rather a law not defined internally, and 
autonomous institutions, unbound from hierarchical relationships, in 
which order seems to simply coincide with the «pure effectiveness of 
the law».
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